This paper presents a model that combines the key features of a Schumpeterian growth model without scale effects and a North-South model of trade. All open economies converge to parallel growth paths because of costly technological transfer. The effects of intellectual property rights (IPR) regimes and trade policies on the growth rate is studied, as well as on a given country's economic performance. The requirement that trade be balanced neutralizes all potential effects of the tariff policy on the world's growth rate, and on the performance of a single country. By contrast, an improvement of a given country's IPR regime is growth neutral, but improves a country's position in the world's productivity rank. These findings are illustrated by simple empirical tests.
INTRODUCTION
One of the main concerns of the modern theory of economic development is how globalization a¤ects economic performance. A signi…cant recent aspect of globalization is the tremendous rise in the degree of economic openness and integration across the world. A key feature of this phenomenon is the increasing developing country share of world trade. Currently trade between the developed (OECD) and developing (non-OECD) countries is the fastest growing category in trade growth statistics. For example, over the past thirty years, the volume of U.S. trade (as a share of US GDP) with non-OECD economies has increased more than four-fold.
The issue of trade openness and the reduction of trade barriers is currently a matter of international debate. Until the mid nineties the developed countries had been the most active pursuers of trade liberalization, whereas now many amongst the less developed countries have begun to promote tari¤ reduction. The most important example is the case of China where the chance to join the WTO is being touted by their leaders as a way "to grow rich".
The perception of bene…cial e¤ects of trade on growth seems to stand at odds with empirical …n d i n g s , however. The tremendous growth in trade volumes contrasts with fairly stable growth rates that have been observed over the past 100 years in developed economies. A natural question to ask is whether the rising degree of trade openness has indeed had any e¤ect on the growth rate of advanced countries, and whether we should expect it to. The present paper analyzes the e¤ects of changing trade policies on regional economic performance as well as on the world's growth rate. A related issue addressed is the e¤ect that the degree of protection of intellectual property rights (IPR) in developing countries has on this. Many experts and commentators have argued that improvement in poor countries'intellectual property rights is key to obtaining growth enhancing e¤ects. The importance of the issue of IPR was con…rmed by its inclusion into the statutes of the WTO in 1994. However, after more than ten years, the extent to which less developed countries should protect intellectual property, and in whose interests such protection should be implemented, is still not clear.
From a theoretical point of view there is no doubt that intellectual property rights matter. Most economists agree that technology is the engine of growth, and the key element that motivates people to devote resources to bene…cial technology improvements is the potential to exploit rents from it that the protection of intellectual property allows. Most authors agree that high standards of IPR protection are bene…cial for the innovating economies (Dinopoulos and Segerstrom 2005; Gancia, 2003; Connolly and Valderrama, 2005) . Some studies (e.g. Helpman, 1993) have, however, highlighted the negative aspects of IPR protection for lagging economies. Strong enforcement of intellectual property protection increases consumer prices and reduces trade bene…ts that could be crucial for developing economies. Most of these studies implicitly assumed perfect substitutability between internationally produced goods. Here I refer to famous hypothesis formulated by Armington (1969) and summarized by Krugman and Obstfeld (1994) , that goods are di¤erentiated according to region of origin. In other words, even within the same sector internationally produced goods are perceived by consumers as imperfect substitutes. Such formulation drifts the attention away from the international aspect of intellectual property rights and points at the local issues of IPR protection.
The term globalization mostly refers to an increase in international openness. In this study I analyze two di¤erent cases of openness: openness to international ‡o w s of ideas and openness to trade. In addition to the e¤ects of trade policies, I consider the impact of regional intellectual property rights regimes on regional economic performance and the world's growth rate. Both issues previously highlighted in the literature play a role: IPR a¤ects the incentives for research in the developed countries as well as prices paid by consumers. The present study seeks to understand to what extent improvements in local IPRs have an e¤ect on the long run growth rate in a globalized world. It also analyzes the nature of transitional changes and the role that trade tari¤s play in the interaction with these changes. Finally, the framework is useful for addressing the issue of whether partial openness (i.e. for trade only, and not for ideas), or no openness, could be more bene…cial for a lagging country than full participation in globalized markets.
I develop a dynamic, general equilibrium model of growth and trade that, importantly, has no scale e¤ects to analyze these issues. To do this, I merge two streams of the literature -modern endogenous growth theory (which allows sophisticated representation of an economy without scale e¤ects) and NorthSouth trade models (with the well-modelled international interactions). I use an extension of the Armington hypothesis to implement trade equations. Using a model without scale e¤ects is essential here because the size of markets increases many fold when countries open themselves to international trade. Models with scale e¤ects, though simpler, lead to immediately counter-factual implications regarding growth rates, and are therefore of little use in analyzing growth related issues. The model developed here is a Schumpeterian multiregion model of growth with both horizontal and vertical expansions. One region (called as frontier country) is determined endogenously as the technological leader and has highest aggregate productivity. Firms from the frontier country devote resources to innovative R&D to discover higher quality products and …r m s from all other countries devote resources to imitative R&D to copy the discoveries made by the technological leaders. A successful imitation results in quality upgrading of local products, that di¤er to some extent from their models from the frontier country. The costs of imitation in a given country depend on its distance to the technological frontier of the frontier country. The rates of innovation and imitation are endogenously determined based on expected pro…t maximization together with labor market clearing conditions. Balanced trade accounts determine the degree of wage inequality between the frontier country and given lagging country.
The paper relates closely to various streams of the literature. The …r s t is the modern Schumpeterian growth literature pioneered by Grossman and Helpman (1991a) , Aghion and Howitt (1991) , Segerstrom, Anant and Dinopoulos (1990) , and developed further by Young (1998) , Howitt (1999) and Peretto and Smulders (2002) . This stream of literature allows to better understand the mechanics of economic growth. The recent contributions allow to model economies growing at constant rates with factor inputs growing (hence -these models are consistent with empirical observations). The scale e¤ect is neutralized by markets expanding into new sectors which e¤ectively dilutes research e¤orts pushing the frontier. The more populous a given economy, the greater the number of sectors (and thus potential directions of research) it o¤ers. Although elegant and consistent with the data, such formulations cause problems when it comes to modelling trade. The question of what happens when two countries of di¤erent sizes (i.e. with a di¤erent number of sectors) start to trade still remains unaddressed in the studies that build on models without scale e¤ects. Until now the literature that employed models without scalee¤ect focused on the ‡o w of ideas as means of international interaction. Here, I posit a modelling solution to the problem of trade between countries of different sizes and hence am able to analyze this situation. The key assumption which allows this is that the trade of goods from various sectors facilitates horizontal expansion in smaller countries. This allows me to solve the model without introducing scale e¤ects while at the same time not violating balanced trade accounting.
The paper is also closely related to the literature on North -South trade.
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I build on the existing North -South trade models (Grossman and Helpman 1991b , Taylor 1993 with the addition of components that allow me to generate a model without scale e¤ects. Some existing studies in this literature have solved the problem of scale e¤ects by postulating the heterogeneity of countries with respect to R&D capabilities (Dinopoulos and Segerstrom, 2005) . In contrast, I present a general framework in which there are no innate di¤erences across agents in their capacity to perform R&D. An additional question often analyzed in the growth literature concerns so called conditional convergence, see Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1997) .
2 Conditional convergence seems to be con…rmed by empirical studies (see Barro, 2001 for an overview) and assigns to each economy its destination position in the world's productivity rank. Changes in policy might result in a shift in such destination positions and lead to transitional growth. Numerous studies highlight factors that could a¤ect conditional convergence, such as capital productivity, rules of law, or distortions of domestic and international markets. My study contributes by adding the degree of intellectual property rights protection and relative size of a given economy (in terms of R&D capable population) as additional factors that could a¤ect conditional convergence. The quality of intellectual property rights is often assumed to be captured by the R&D productivity parameter, which does not allow for a deeper analysis of potential disadvantages of strong IPR (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1997; Dinopoulos and Segerstrom, 2005) . Other existing studies that analyze aspects of intellectual property protection mainly discuss their international aspects (Taylor 1993 , Gancia, 2003 . A number of studies (e.g. Helpman 1993, Grossman and Lai, 2002 ) that consider local IPR regimes, focus on the potential drawbacks of strong IPR. Recent evidence on the costliness of imitation (Coe and Helpman, 1995 or Benhabib and Spiegel, 2002) suggests that one should include the costs of imitative R&D also. This could signi…cantly change the conclusions by neutralizing the negative price e¤ect through increased R&D incentives. My study also develops this direction. Here, stronger IPR increases the price of locally produced goods, and also increases the expected returns from investment (which matters with positive costs of imitation).
The main results of the paper are: (1) an improvement in IPR by lagging countries does not have any global e¤ect on growth rates. If any group of lagging countries (no matter how large) decides to change its IPR regime, this will only a¤ect countries within this group. (2) Any improvement of intellectual property protection implies a change in the structure of individual income. Particularly, the share of income accruing to monopolistic …r m s grows and the share that comes from wages paid to labor shrinks. (3) The factors that determine conditional convergence are the degree of IPR protection and the volume of skilled (R&D capable) workers in the economy. (4) No openness at all of a single lagging country may result in faster growth than engagement in globalization (full openness). This paper is structured as follows. The next section sketches the theoretical model. Section three presents the dynamics of the model. Section four presents the main properties of the equilibrium and discusses the potential bene…ts of openness. Section …ve performs a simple empirical test that supports the theoretical predictions. The last section concludes and points out directions for future research.
THE MODEL
In this section I discuss the role of the main assumptions that underlie the theoretical model. I also present the basic equations I will use in my analysis.
The construction of the model presented in this section heavily follows so called Schumpeterian models of creative destruction proposed by Grossman and Helpman (1991a) and Aghion and Howitt (1992) though the formulation here, which aims to rule out scale e¤ects is heavily in ‡uenced by Howitt (1999 and .
Overview
Consider a multi -region model where regions are distinguished by the size of population and by the degree of intellectual property rights (IPR) protection. Speci…cally, there is only one region -the frontier country -where intellectual property is fully protected.
3 All other regions -the lagging countries -have weaker and thus imperfect protection of intellectual property.
Each region has a continuum of sectors that produce commodity goods. Each sector is subject to technical progress. Workers in all regions are assumed to be capable of conducting vertical (technology improving) R&D that reduces the costs of production. Each industry o¤ers an in…nite number of potential technology improvements. Meanwhile there are new and new sector created in the process of serendipitous discoveries. Newly created sectors start with technological levels similar to those already existing.
There are two channels of international interaction: trade in commodities and the ‡o w of ideas. Incentives for trade come from individual preferences as individuals gain additional utility from consumption of international products. This is an extension of the Armington hypothesis, and in practice this is expressed by a standard CES-utility function with goods di¤erentiated with respect to their origin of production.
The second channel of international interaction is ‡o w of ideas. It a¤ects both: vertical and horizontal expansion. First, international ‡o w of ideas allows for imitation of old technologies in the lagging countries. Imitation requires some resources to be spent. The costliness of imitation is an observed and widely accepted phenomenon, see for example Mans…eld, Schwartz and Wagner (1981) , Coe and Helpman (1995) or Benhabib and Spiegel (2002) . Costliness implies that when a country wants to create a new generation of a product or to open a new line of varieties, it must pay costs proportional to the costs that have been paid to make the discovery and proportional to the current stat-of-the-art technology in the given sector. This is captured by an index of copying di¢ culty. This index depends positively on the size of the lag relative to the advanced country. In terms of vertical R&D -the further a sector in a given country is from the technological frontier, and the more steps "up-the quality ladder" have been made abroad, the easier it is to take the next step. The second case of international ‡o w of ideas concerns the pace of horizontal expansion (opening of new sectors). The new sectors are being created in the process of serendipitous discoveries. However, the open countries can bene…t from the fact that trade with goods of new sectors, so that countries that trade with goods have same numbers of sectors opened.
Industry Structure
There is a continuum of regions indexed by j, that range from 0 to 1. In each region there is a continuum of industries indexed by i 2 [0; B jt ). In each industry i …r m s di¤er with respect to the technology of production they posses. A better technology implies lower unit costs required to produce a given good i. To discover unit cost reductions, …r m s in each industry participate in innovative R&D races. When the state-of-the-art technology in a given industry is k, the next winner of an innovative R&D race becomes the sole producer with a k + 1 technology. Thus, over time, the quantities produced grow as innovations push technology in each industry up its "quality ladder".
A more detailed study of the industry structure is presented later.
Individuals
Each region has a …x e d number of households. Each household member lives forever and is endowed with one unit of labor that is inelastically supplied in exchange for wage (w j t ). The number of members of each household grows exponentially at a …x e d rate g L > 0, the population growth rate. Each region has identical rates of population growth so that the ratios of population volumes in all regions are proportional. Let L j > 0 be the size of representative household in region j and let L j t denote the supply of labor in region j at time t, hence:
Households in all countries share identical preferences. Each household is modeled as a dynastic family that consists of in…nitely-lived consumers that maximizes discounted lifetime utility given by:
where u(c t ) denotes the individual utility form consumption at t and is the rate of time preference. The constant expenditure path is optimal if and only if the interest rate is equal to:
Individual utility at t is equal to:
where u t (c t (i)) denotes the utility of consumption of products from sector i and B max j t denotes the total number of sectors, of which goods are available in j . Goods in each sector i can be produced in any region j. The individual utility of consumption of a product from sector i is therefore:
so that products from di¤erent regions are gross substitutes. Denote the per sector expenditures in country j by E j t . Each individual at time t maximizes u(c t (i)) subject to the budget constraint. The logarithmic preferences de…ned by (4) imply that in equilibrium each individual spends equal amounts per sector. Within each sector he demands goods produced in all countries. Note that this also implies that consumers choose the cheapest products from each industry of each country. To express the gross prices that consumers need to pay for a given good, introduce the parameter j 1: This parameter re ‡ects the institutional, legal and regulatory impediments to entering directly into a market of country j by o¤ering a consumption product.
Parameter j should be interpreted as a iceberg cost of international trade. 4 The case of j = 1 denotes fully free access to international markets; the opposite, limiting case of j ! 1 represents extremely high levels of tari¤s so that there is no international trade with given country. The case when j ! 1 will be discussed in subsection 4.1. In the preceding analysis we take j as …n i t e , thus trade is being observed.
The total demand for good i produced in country j equals:
where:
jj 0 are the tari¤s imposed by j on j 0 such that: j j 0 = 1 if j = j 0 and
is the price in industry i in country j at t.
Production
Production consists of continuum of industries (indexed by i) utilizing labor as the only input. One worker at time t can produce A j t (i) goods in industry i in country j . A j t (i) changes as a result of technological progress. Every new discovery increases A j t (i) by an exogenous factor >1.
Every new discovery results in the establishment of a local monopolist that has the unique right to produce with the state-of-the-art technology A j t (i) in j . We will assume that discoveries are large enough so that there is no potential threat of domestic competition.
5 Thus, a monopolist in given sector is restricted only by international competition. Denote the instantaneous pro…ts of a regional quality leader by j t (i), where:
Maximizing j t (i) with respect to p j t (i) and taking into account equation (6) determines the unconstrained monopolistic price: 4 One can assume that the tari¤ revenues are paid back to citizens of j as a lump -sum transfer.
5 Alternatively suppose that each time a new discovery occurs, the old monopolist faces a threat of being undercut by the new entrant that possesses now a better technology. Therefore the old monopolist decides to quit the market.
which is the standard monopoly markup of price over marginal cost. Equation (8) implies that a regional quality leader in given industry at time t earns the ‡o w pro…t of:
Recall that there is a continuum of markets, so that there is no e¤ect of a single market on total demand. Hence instantaneous pro…ts at t of a regional monopolist in j are equal to:
R&D
The R&D sector also uses labor as the only input. 6 The purpose of research activity is to improve productivity in given sector. Patents in all the lagging countries are imperfect. The imperfection of the quality of protection of intellectual property implies that at each instant of time there is a chance that the patent granted to the current monopolist becomes violable. Let be the instantaneous probability of such an event. In such a representation symbolizes both the degree of monopolistic power given to the discoverer and the quality of legal enforcement. The case of = 0 denotes the case when intellectual property rights are perfectly protected, i.e. there is no risk for a current state-of-the art producer that his technology becomes publicly available. The opposite limiting case of ! 1 means that there is virtually no protection of intellectual property in a given country.
If a company loses its patent before a succeeding discovery occurs, its sector becomes leveled to competition and Bertrand competition drives the prices to marginal costs of production p j t (i) = w j t =A j t (i).
Every vertical innovation in industry i increases marginal labor output by an exogenous factor >1. A successful discoverer bene…ts by a stream of monopolistic pro…ts in their industry until replaced by the next discovery or the patent becomes violable.
Successful imitation (copying) also takes the form of an increase in labor productivity by : Let x j t be the di¢ culty parameter that adjusts the instantaneous probability of a discovery in region j : The ease by which the next step up the "quality ladder" can be taken depends on the degree a given sector in a given country lags the world technology frontier. This degree of lagging of country j in sector i is well captured by the average technology of all the countries that are technologically advanced compared to country j in this sector. Thus:
where f( ) is the density function of technology in all countries, with the convention of f > 0 (so that countries are ordered from the most lagging to the most advanced). Such a representation of x j t is rather complicated to use in analysis, so for tractability I work with a simpli…ed version of this index which has similar qualitative properties. Speci…cally, I will utilize the average productivity level of only one country (the frontier country) as the bench mark. Such a formulation corresponds to that used in Acemoglu, Zilibotti (2002, 2003) , where the frontier sector/country is the point of reference used there as well.
Consequently the di¢ culty of progress in region j is:
where
is the average productivity in country j and A 1t denotes the average productivity of the frontier country 7 . The di¢ culty of vertical research is equal to the inverse of the distance to the technological frontier.
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Labor is the only input in vertical R&D and free entry is assumed. Any R&D …r m that hires n j t (i) units of labor in industry i at t is successful in 7 Consequently I henceforth denote with subscript 1 all the variables related to the frontier country.
8 Thus for the frontier country x 1t = 1: discovery of the next higher -quality product with probability [ n j t (i)=x j t ] where > 0 is the productivity parameter of vertical innovations. Denote by V j t (i) the value of a successful vertical innovation in sector i. By the noarbitrage condition, the marginal revenue of vertical research ([V j t (i) =x j t ]) must be equal to the marginal costs of research w j t , hence:
Horizontal Expansion
The horizontal expansion occurs in the process of serendipitous discoveries (as in Howitt, 2000) . A successful event in the process of horizontal expansion results in establishment of a new industry lab in the manufacturing sector. New monopolists enjoy a pro…t stream until displaced by the next discovery.
Assume that the technological level of the newly established industry is randomly drawn from technological levels of existing products. The likelihood of a new establishing to occur is proportional to the volume of population in given country as well as to its average productivity. Moreover, the trading countries bene…t from the fact that they trade with goods from various sectors, so that the volume of sectors in the globalized world is same for all countries. The pace with which a new industry is then determined by the largest country in terms of R&D capable population (L max ) Consequently, the rate of new product innovation in a isolated country is:
and in the globalized world:
where >0 and L max t is the largest R&D capable population of a country engaged in globalization.
The Stock Market
There is a stock market that transfers savings of consumers to local …r m s engaged in R&D. It helps individuals to diversify the risk of holding stocks issued by these …r m s . Since, in each country, there is a continuum of industries and the expected returns to R&D activities are not …r m or industry speci…c, each investor can completely mitigate risk by holding a perfectly diversi…ed portfolio of stocks. Thus, the value of expected returns from holding the stocks of regional quality leaders (V j t (i) ) must be equal for each industry (i.e., it does not depend on i). This value equals the stream of pro…ts discounted by the subjective rate of time -preference, rate of population growth and adjusted for the probability of losing monopolistic power. Thus:
Di¤erentiating (16) with respect to time yields:
For an investor in a stock, every time increment brings pro…ts of j t (i) and appreciation of stock value of _ V j t (i). In case of new discoveries or losses in IPR protection, the investor su¤ers a loss of V j t (i): This happens if another …r m reports a success in vertical R&D (with instantaneous probability n j (i) =x j ) or if a given sector becomes leveled (with instantaneous probability j ). No arbitrage implies that this return must equal the market interest rate that by (3) equals the subjective discount factor ( ) minus the rate of population growth (g L ).
THE STEADY-STATE
This section presents the solution of the model for a limiting steady-state equilibrium where all endogenous variables grow at constant rates over time. In this balanced growth equilibrium, variables that are constant over time include per-sector consumption expenditures E j , the wage rates for labor w j , the per-sector innovation and imitation rate n j and the regional distance to the frontier 1=x j .
Horizontal Research and Labor per Sector Steady-State Conditions
This subsection solves for the horizontal expansion and labor per sector steadystate condition. Let b j t L j t =B j t denote the volume of labor per sector in region j . Thus:
The rate of horizontal expansion is described for a country that remains in autarchy by (14) and for a country that is engaged in globalization by (15). Thus (18) implies that for a country that is engaged in globalization b j t converges to:
and for an isolated country:
where l j is the relative size of a country's compared to the largest country engaged in globalization, such that:
The above presented equations mean that in all countries the value of b j is constant over time. In other words, number of people per sector is constant. In terms of individual utility from consumption (4) these results imply that for a country that engages in globalization B max j t = B t , and for a country that remains isolated B max j t = B j t .
Representative Prices
This subsection introduces the notion of representative prices. A representative price is the expected price of a randomly selected commodity in a given region. In the frontier country, all the sectors are controlled by monopolies, so that all the prices (hence the representative price as well) are monopolistic prices. However, in the lagging countries, some sectors (fraction j t of the total number of sectors) are levelled by competition and have Bertrand prices of p j (i) = w j t =A j t (i): The values of the fractions of leveled sectors describe the market structure and can be computed as the relative instantaneous probability of losing IPR protection ( j ) to the aggregate instantaneous probability of losing monopolistic power (by loss of IPR protection or by new discovery) 9 :
Thus, for country j in steady state the representative price is:
9 More formally j is the limit value of market structure in country j described by:
Trade Balance
This subsection presents the trade balance. Balance on the trade account requires that for any country j the values of imports and exports are equal. Hence:
Using the introduced notion of representative prices, the above equations can be represented as:
Equation (25) implies that the ratio of per sector expenditures to the adjusted per capita price level is constant across the regions. Consequently, anything that could a¤ect the world price index -particularly changes in IPR regimes of other regions (whether such changes occur in one region or in a larger group of regions) does not a¤ect Q. Any changes abroad are immunized by the trade account. A more detailed discussion of this result is presented later. Note that the constancy of Q across countries together with equation (10) translates into the following expression of instantaneous pro…ts earned by local monopolists:
LABOR MARKET Now consider the labor market. Every agent in each region can choose between being employed in production or in a research company. Thus, total population consists of people employed in production and vertical research. The labor market equation for each country can be represented as follows:
Employment in production in country j is equal to: 
Hence for country j the labor market constraint becomes:
The Stock Market
In the steady state equilibrium the value of expected returns from holding the stocks of regional quality leader is constant over time (i.e. _ V j = 0). Recall that no-arbitrage in entrepreneurial entry requires the value of a vertical discovery to be equal to the opportunity cost of research (i.e. to the wage) adjusted for the probability of achieving a given discovery ( =x j t ). This is represented by equation (13) and together with (17) implies that in a steady state:
Steady-State Equilibrium
This subsection presents a detailed solution of the model for a limiting steadystate equilibrium. First, I present the solution for the frontier country and then for a representative lagging country j . Since all sectors in the frontier country have monopolistic prices, solving the model for a steady-state equilibrium for the frontier country reduces to solving a system of three equations [the innovative R&D condition given by (29), pro…t equation (26) (26) in (29) gives a system of two equations and two unknowns. In this respect, this model of trade is similar to Grossman and Helpman (1991a) , who also obtain a system where the equilibrium is determined by the pro…t equation and resource constraint.
Solving the pro…t equation [(26) and (29)] together with the labor market constraint (28) yields the following steady-state conditions for the frontier country:
These two equations can be re-arranged to express the values of per-sector expenditures and per sector R&D intensity of the frontier country:
Before discussing the characteristics of this steady state, I brie ‡y present the steady state in a representative lagging country. Note that the values of expenditures and research of the frontier country (E 1 and n 1 ) depend only on parameter values. They cannot be a¤ected by any changes of policy in any lagging country. Hence, each lagging country takes the values of E 1 and n 1 as given.
To …n d the right expression for the vertical R&D intensity in j , recall that the di¢ culty parameter x j is the inverse of the distance to the frontier 1=x j = A 1 =A j . In steady state, all countries have the same rate of technological progress hence _ x j = 0. This implies that:
Hence, in the steady state, vertical R&D intensity of a given lagging country is the frontier country's R&D intensity adjusted by the distance to the frontier.
Rearranging equation (28) together with the above expression of j 's vertical R&D intensity yields the lagging country's labor market condition:
The Constancy of Q implies that:
Solving the imitative R&D condition (29) and substituting into (26) yields the lagging country's steady-state R&D investment condition:
To close the model, note that j can be interpreted as the expected adjusted price in j :
therefore for any region j , j ( ) can be treated as an additional parameter. Equations (35) (37) can be solved for the unique equilibrium per-sector expenditures (E j ), wages (w j ) and distance to the frontier (1=x j ).
MAIN PROPERTIES OF THE STEADY-STATE EQUILIBRIUM
I start the discussion of the above-described Steady-State equilibrium from the perspective of the frontier country region. The degree of IPR in any lagging country, and any foreign tari¤ do not appear in the frontier country's steady state conditions: (32) and (33). The volume of consumption expenditures (E 1 ) and vertical research (n 1 ) in the frontier country do not depend on any foreign IPR regime or tari¤ policy. Hence, the frontier's (and the world's) growth rate are una¤ected by any changes in tari¤s or IPR regimes in the any of the lagging countries. In summary:
Proposition 1 In steady-state the rate of economic growth of all open economies is equal to the growth rate of the technologically most advanced economy. This rate of economic growth depends neither on any trade policies of any country ( j ) nor on any potential changes in IPR regimes in technologically lagging countries ( j ).
In order to understand these results recall the equation (26). This allows for a re-interpretation of instantaneous pro…ts: each company in a given sector sells its products abroad to foreign companies from the same sector and gets their products in exchange. These products are then sold on the local market and potential pro…ts from this transaction are earned by local companies. In such a case any change in the foreign price (due to change of j or j ) is perfectly neutralized by changes in demand on markets other than j : In other words -any reduction in the local demand for a good on a given fraction of markets is immediately neutralized through the balanced trade account by increased demand in the remaining share of the markets. Thus, any changes of IPR policies in lagging countries, or of trade policy in any country, have no e¤ect on expected pro…ts from a successful discovery in the frontier country and hence are growth-neutral. Now I restrict myself to study the e¤ects of changes of IPR and tari¤s on a given lagging country. To study these e¤ects I concentrate on the equations (35) (37). Plugging (37) for wages into (35) and solving for per sector expenditures gives the unique solution for the distance to the frontier of a representative lagging country j :
Note that when j = 0 (i.e. when the intellectual property rights in a given lagging country are perfect) then 1=x j = L 1 =L j : Thus, when intellectual property is perfect, relative productivity of a given region is proportional to its size measured in R&D capable labor force. However, if patents are imperfect, then distance to the frontier increases with reductions in the quality of IPR protection. (@ j =@ j < 0 hence @ (1=x j ) =@ j > 0). Consequently, a discrete improvement of a country's IPR regime results in conditional convergence to a new position that is closer to the technological frontier. This is in contrast with the recent theories on IPR and development (Helpman 1993, Grossman and Lai, 2002) . Taking into account the empirical …n d i n g about the costliness of the technological transfer changes the results -IPR are useful also for the lagging countries. Figure one presents an illustration of the dependence of distance to the frontier as a function of quality of IPR and size of given economy (measured in R&D capable workers). The distance to the frontier of the given following economy (1=x j ) is presented on the vertical axis -higher values of 1=x j correspond to greater dis- tance to the frontier. The horizontal axes represent the relative size of given economy (L 1 =L j ) and the inverse of the quality of intellectual property protection ( j ). The function presented in the …g u r e increases in j and decreases in L 1 =L j . Thus, larger economies (in terms of R&D capable population) tend to be located closer to the technological frontier. Weaker protection of intellectual property (higher j ) increases the distance to the technological leader.
Similarly, as in the frontier country, trade restrictions have no e¤ect on conditional convergence of lagging countries. The underlying mechanism for this is the same as in the frontier country -any changes in tari¤s result only in changes in trade volumes but not in expected rewards from monopolistic pro…ts. A potential increase in tari¤s in some regions causes a decrease in exports to these regions but the potential losses from this export slowdown are perfectly neutralized by increased exports to other markets. These results tend to suggest that, for a given lagging country, an improvement in the IPR regime seems to be a better solution than pursuing tari¤ changes. The conclusions presented above are summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 2 In a steady-state, a country's relative per capita income depends positively on its degree of protection of intellectual property rights ( j ) and its size in terms of R&D capable population (L j ). Import tari¤s ( j ) are neutral in their e¤ect on a country's relative per capita income.
Bene…ts of Engagement
The model allows me to address the question of potential bene…ts of engagement in globalization. By engagement I consider access to world trade and openness for international ‡o w of ideas. The previous subsection analyzed the case when a given lagging country participated in both international trade as well as in the international ideas transfer. This sections studies the case when a given lagging country does not open at all (remains in autarky).
The case when given country opens for international ‡o w of ideas only has been signalled by Howitt (2000) and further developed by Klenow and Rodríguez (2005) . They found that engagement in the world ‡o w of ideas signi…cantly improves the economic performance of a single country compared to the case of autarky. This subsection contributes to the literature by analyzing the cases when trade openness is also possible.
The case I want to study in this subsection is the case of complete autarky. A country becomes closed to trade (e.g. because j = +1 or because trade is excluded exogenously by geographical distance or some non-tari¤ barriers) and has no access to international ‡o w of ideas. This implies that output is sold on the local market only.
10 Such a speci…cation allows us to solve the model's steady -state equations just for one country. As shown in the appendix the …n a l vertical R&D intensity and growth rate is constant and depends positively on the quality of IPR protection.
A surprising …n d i n g is that autarky can lead to higher growth rates than full openness. Under openness a country grows at a rate that is proportional to the frontier's country growth rate n 1 . Under autarky a country's growth depends on only its own R&D. However, it may grow faster because fewer sectors will be opened. Speci…cally, if this country can impose strict IPR protection it can actually achieve a higher rate of growth than it would under full participation in global markets. In summary:
Proposition 3 If given closed economy can impose a su¢ ciently high degree of protection of intellectual property, and if the degree of competition in its As shown in the appendix this line is downward -sloping in j : All IPR levels higher that j result in a higher growth rate than the frontier's. Note that the possibility of higher growth in a closed economies occurs as long as > =( 1); i.e. when international competition is more …e r c e than the local one (limited by the size of discovery ). If this does not hold, and local competition is as …e r c e as the international, closed economies are not able to generate higher growth than the globalized world. This case corresponds to the dashed line A 0 in …g u r e two. Country j cannot report higher intensity of vertical R&D than the open economies. Moreover, any weakening of IPR protection in j results in lower intensity of research and leads to slower growth and divergence.
Income Structure
To close this section I check the potential consequences of IPR improvements on the income composition in a given lagging country. A commonly raised argument against stronger intellectual property protection is that it bene…ts only "capitalists" whose incomes come mostly as dividends from invested capital. According to such reasoning, workers whose incomes consist mostly of wages, do not bene…t from these changes as much as "capitalists".
I study this claim by analyzing the e¤ect of changes of j on the structure of individual income. There are two main components of individual income: wages earned in production/research and dividends paid by monopolistic companies that produce consumption goods. Using (10) and (37) the ratio of wages and monopolistic pro…ts is:
which can be re-expressed as:
Rearranging yields:
Thus:
since:
Hence the derivative of the above expression with respect to j is positive. Thus an improvement of the quality of IPR protection reduces the wage/pro…t ratio. Weaker IPR implies that a larger share of income comes from wages paid to labor, whereas stronger IPR translates into higher signi…cance of pro…ts from successful R&D investments. If a country has an unequal distribution of equities, an improvement in IPR could indeed lead to a signi…cant distortion away from labor, and increase inequality.
THE EMPIRICAL EXAMPLE
Although an empirical analysis is not the main goal of this paper, a simple look at some readily available cross-country data does suggest that there is something to the …n d i n g s presented above. The goal of this exercise is to check the theoretical prediction about the signi…cance of IPR and insigni…cance of tari¤s on the distance to the frontier. According to propositions two and three, weaker IPR should increase the distance to the frontier of given country irrespective of its openness.
To perform the empirical test I need data on Intellectual Property Rights quality (IPR jt ) across the world. There are two issues that need to be addressed when specifying the quality of IPR: the quality of law and the level of its enforcement. I refer to the IPR quality index introduced by Ostergard (2000) . This index is a multiplier of the degree to which intellectual property is literally protected with the quality of enforcement of given law. Higher values of the index correspond to higher quality of IPR in a given country. The values of the index range from …ve (the best quality of IPR protection) to one (the worst quality of IPR protection).
The second observable is the distance to the frontier (DIST jt ), taken from Penn World Table on real GDP per capita relative to the United States. My sample consists of 67 countries 11 , both OECD and non-OECD economies. Following the theoretical predictions of Howitt (2000) and signalled by the empirical studies of Lichtenberg (1993) , I decide to control for the e¤ects of investments on economic distance. I include the rate of investments as another controlled variable into the regression. I take the data from Penn World Table on the share of investments in GDP. Other controls I include in my sample are the degree of openness, country size and the set of geographical characteristics.
The estimates of the linear coe¢ cients are presented in the table one. These estimates are consistent with the theoretical predictions. The IPR coe¢ cient is always negative and highly signi…cant. Adding the time dummy or various controls does not a¤ect the result. An additional exercise is to check what is the role of openness in the relationship between IPR and distance to frontier. To perform this exercise, the …r s t step is to specify the subsets of open and closed economies. To do so it is not enough to look at the tari¤ rates or at the share of trade in GDP. In fact the tari¤s are just a nominal control variable and do not re ‡ect many nontari¤ barriers as well as whether a given economy is oriented to exchange with the globalized world or not. The share of trade in GDP is a highly endogenous variable and cannot be used as a credible proxy of openness. In order to determine the degree of openness of developing economies I take the index of openness introduced by Sachs and Warner (1995) where the "openness" of a given country depends on average level of tari¤ and non-tari¤ barriers, black market premium, central control of major exports, or whether a given country is classi…ed as "socialist".
Having de…ned the sub-samples that contain open and closed economies I perform the regressions with distance to frontier (real GDP per capita relative to the United States) as the dependant variable. The estimated values of parameters for the open economies are presented in table two, the results for closed economies are presented in table three. Again, intellectual property rights is highly signi…cant for the distance to frontier of given country. Though not meant to be a de…nitive econometric demonstration, it is encouraging that these simple correlations in the data are consistent with the theoretical predictions. Better protection of intellectual property tends to reduce the distance to the frontier. This suggests that a more in depth empirical analysis of this issue is a worthwhile subject of future research.
CONCLUSIONS
A central …n d i n g here is that the long run growth rate is una¤ected by either trade agreements or potential changes in IPR regimes in technologically lagging countries. This conclusion comes from the analysis of a standard multi-country model of trade and economic growth without scale e¤ects. The conclusion is consistent with the empirical observations of no e¤ect of factor input growth or increasing trade volumes on apparent long run economic growth rates in industrialized countries.
The second message that comes from this paper is that because di¤usion of technologies is not costless, di¤erences in knowledge adoption intensities may explain a signi…cant portion of income di¤erences across countries. There are two main components that a¤ect the cross -country di¤erences in copying activities: Firstly, the degree of intellectual property rights protection signi…-cantly a¤ects the long run relative productivity of a given country. Since the degree to which intellectual property is protected positively a¤ects incentives to imitate, an improvement of IPR regime results in conditional convergence towards the technological frontier and to a new steady-state equilibrium. Secondly, the volume of skilled labor determines the relative position of a lagging region. Because of positive externalities, larger countries o¤er products that are more desired by consumers. This translates into higher expected profits from successful research and higher R&D. These two conclusions …t well the commonly known empirical observations on conditional convergence (see Barro, 2001 ). The results of two simple empirical regressions presented in section …ve additionally support these …n d i n g s .
The third observation is about the possible positive e¤ects of no openness at all (in terms of trade and knowledge ‡o w s ) on growth of a country. This is because openness tends to utilize a country's resource into full R&D engagement in all the sectors that are subject to trade. This has the e¤ect of diluting R&D e¤ort and lowering aggregate growth. By contrast under autarky, a stable growth rate is generated since there is no dilution. However, this rate of growth can be smaller than in the globalized world.
The last conclusion that needs to be highlighted regards the potential drawbacks of IPR improvement. My model shows that better protection of intellectual property causes a shift in the structure of individual income. A larger share of individual income comes from dividends paid by monopolistic …r m s . When there exists an unequal distribution of assets in a given society, this could lead to a signi…cant distortion away from labour. Increasing inequality could trigger some undesired phenomena such as corruption and rent -seeking, that could even halt the development of a given region. I …n i s h this section with an indication of some points in the analysis that will be extended and improved in future research. I assumed throughout that each country was too small to a¤ect world prices. This assumption will be relaxed in future studies. Doing so would allow one to check what happens if a single market matters for pricing decisions of …r m s or if a …r m has enough market power to a¤ect the prices in its sector. Another interesting task would be to focus more on the aspect of local (domestic) competition. Clearly the IPR parameter j captures to some extent the degree of domestic competition. Nevertheless, in my study international competition was the major force driving the monopolistic decision. One could go one step further and distinguish between IPR and local competition policy. Finally future research could focus on the identi…cation of the other factors that a¤ect international knowledge spillovers Joint ventures, capital ‡o w s , migration of key personnel and cultural/geographical proximity may all play important roles.
APPENDIX

IPR and growth in a closed economy:
When a monopolist in j is constraint by the local competition only, it sets the price equal to the marginal cost of the previous monopolist in given sector: w j t =A j t . Thus, the scaling parameter for the price level in given country j becomes: j 1 j j + n j + j j + n j and the expected price equals to:
This, together with (28) gives the labor market equation:
The monopolistic pro…ts earned by a monopolist in j become:
The pro…t condition is derived by plugging (42) into (29):
The above -presented labor market equation and pro…t condition can be rewritten as the quadratic equation of n j :
so that n j is the positive square -root of (44) given by:
The derivative of the above expression with respect to j is: 
